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In case one needs to look up something online, she needs to “google” it. This phrase is 
being used by millions of people around the world nowadays, something that no one could have 
initially anticipated. Founded in 1998, Google LLC. a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc. is currently 
one of the biggest multinational tech companies in the world focusing on internet-related 
services and products. Originally a research project of two PhD. students at Stanford University 
is currently gaining over $182,527 billion in revenue in the fiscal year of 2020, which is up by 
12% from $161,857 billion in the fiscal year of 2019.1 Although its primary objective as a 
search tool was to “organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and 
useful”2, Google’s business model has extended to other spheres as well – such as internet  
browsers (Chrome), operating systems (Android), hardware (Nexus) or household technology 
(Nest). Thus, over the time, Google has become what academics refer to as “multi-product 
ecosystem”3, because it offers various products and services, which are often interconnected.  
Its flagship product - search engine Google Search - is nowadays being used mostly “for 
free”4, while receiving revenue from online advertising, which forms the biggest part of 
Google’s overall revenue.5 This business model is not unusual in the digital economy build on 
online platforms – on the contrary, it is very common.6  
 
1 ALPHABET INC. (2020). Alphabet Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2020 Results 
(https://abc.xyz/investor/static/pdf/2020Q4_alphabet_earnings_release.pdf?cache=9e991fd, last accessed on 7 
July 2021).  
 
2 GOOGLE. From the garage to the Googleplex ( https://about.google/our-story/, last accessed on 27 June 2021).  
 
3 Google ecosystem consists of Android, Google Search, Chrome, Google Docs, Google Play, Google Drive, 
Google Translate, Gmail, Google Maps, Google Shopping, Google Jobs, Google Home, YouTube etc.; See 
FLETCHER, Amelia (2020). Digital competition policy: Are ecosystems different? Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Hearing on Competition Economics of Digital Ecosystems, 
(https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2020)96/en/pdf, last accessed on 27 June 2021) page 2, para. 6.  
 
4 Users pay with their data. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Press Release (2017). Antitrust: Commission fines 
Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison-
shopping service, (https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm, last accessed on 27 June 2021). 
Similarly, in case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping) Commission Decision C(2017) 4444, para. 320. 
 
5 ROSENBERG, Eric (2020). How Google makes money. Investopedia, 
(https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/020515/business-google.asp, last accessed on 27 June 2021).   
 
6 EVANS, David S. (2016). Multisided Platforms, Dynamic Competition, and the Assessment of Market Power for 
Internet-based Firms, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 753, 
(https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2468&context=law_and_economics, last 
accessed 27 June 2021), page 10.  
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The impact of Google’s presence worldwide is undisputed and enormous, which is also 
demonstrated by Google.com being the most visited website in the world, with knowledge of 
over 130 trillion webpages.7 When focusing only on Europe, Google Search is the most used 
search engine with about 90% of search quarries in the majority of EU countries.8  
Nonetheless, with great power comes great responsibility. In 2010 the European 
Commission (“the Commission”) has initiated antitrust investigation into Google’s conduct 
after receiving rival search service providers’ complaints. Little did Google know that this is 
only the beginning of what turned out to be several years of investigations followed by 
unprecedented fines.  
The objective of this thesis is to assess the Commission’s approach towards Google in 
its antitrust investigations, focusing on qualitative side of the theory of consumer harm. More 
precisely, it will be determined whether it is the conduct of Google that diminishes, firstly, 
consumer choice and secondly, innovation or whether it is the allegedly interventionist 
approach of the Commission established through the remedies stipulated in the decisions. I have 
chosen to focus particularly on consumer choice and innovation, because these two criteria play 
an essential role in modern competition law, as will be further explained below.  
 The above-mentioned objective of this thesis will be achieved by analysing three 
relatively recent cases regarding the abuse of dominant position by Google within the EU. 
Firstly, the case of Google Search9 will be discussed in Chapter 3, subsequently the case of 
Google Android10 in Chapter 4 and finally the case of Google AdSense11 will be addressed in 
Chapter 5. The three separate studies of these cases will focus on two key elements - firstly, the 
actual conduct of Google and its consequences and secondly, the assessment by the 
Commission and its impact, while keeping in the spotlight the concept of consumer choice and 
innovation as the key principles. These studies of the case law coupled with the current 
 
7 SCHWARTZ, Barry (2016). Google’s search knows about over 130 trillion pages, Search engine land 
(https://searchengineland.com/googles-search-indexes-hits-130-trillion-pages-documents-263378, last accessed 
on 27 June 2021).  
 
8 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016). Commission Staff Working Document on Online Platforms, accompanying 
the document "Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market" (COM (2016) 288), 
(https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-staff-working-document-online-platforms, last 
accessed on 27 June 2021).  
 
9 Case AT.39740 - Google Search (Shopping), Commission Decision C(2017) 4444. 
 
10 Case AT.40099 - Google Android, Commission Decision C(2018) 4761. 
 




situation, shall deliver answers to the research question above. The studies will be construed to 
address the factual background, followed by a short summary and finally an analysis followed 
by a conclusion. Lastly, in Chapter 6, I will address Regulation 2019/115012 and proposal of 
Digital Market Act13 in connection with the potential development of Google’s position as well 
as the position of online platforms in general, to establish a broader outlook on this topic. 
However, to provide a complex understanding of the research issue, it is essential to 
firstly establish the economic specifics of Google ecosystem as primarily ad-centric14 platform-
based business, because one of its main products - Google Search, plays a specific role as a 
multi-sided platform in all of the analysed decisions. Thus, firstly the economic specifics of 
online platforms will be discussed in Chapter 1, followed by the stipulation of consumer harm 
present in the digital markets in Chapter 2. 
  
 
12 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting 
fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, OJ L 186/57, 11.7.2019.  
 
13 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on contestable 
and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM/2020/842 final.  
 
14 BOURREAU, Mark (2020). Some Economics of Digital Ecosystems, OECD, Hearing on Competition 




1. Economic specifics of multisided platforms 
Platforms are two-sided or multi-sided markets, established by platform operator, which 
facilitate interactions between users.15 Multi-sided markets have been a highly discussed topic 
amongst researchers and practitioners for some time now.16 Although a vast part of these 
discussions are nowadays focused on digital economy and internet platforms, multi-sidedness 
is by no means a new phenomenon. Various “offline” markets – such as markets for credit 
cards, TV and newspapers were found to be multi-sided in the past.17 Indeed, influence of the 
internet and related technologies has enabled creation of new (online) platform business 
models, which are no longer geographically or physically limited, compared to the “offline” 
ones like newspapers and thus are even more complex.  
It is not an easy task to determine whether a market is multi-sided, as there is no consensus 
on the definition of multi-sided market. However, the essential principles could be summarized 
to characterize a multi-sided market as: “a market in which a firm acts as a platform and sells 
different products to different groups of consumers, while recognising that the demand from 
one group of customer depends on the demand from the other group(s)”.18 Therefore, there 
have to be at least two different interdependent groups of customers for multi-sidedness to 
occur.   
It is crucial for the competition authorities to distinguish between “one-sided” and “multi-
sided” markets, because (online) multi-sided markets have their economic specifics which need 
to be taken into consideration when deciding whether to intervene and how. This is reflected 
by multiple recent works concerning the issue of (online) platforms, which recognize and 
 
15 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016). Commission Staff Working Document on Online Platforms, 
accompanying the document "Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market" (COM (2016) 
288), (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-staff-working-document-online-platforms, 
last accessed on 27 June 2021). 
 
16 WISMER, Sebastian, BONGARD, Christian, RASEK, Arno (2017). Multi-Sided Market Economics in 
Competition Law Enforcement, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 8, Issue 4, pages 257–
262. 
 
17 Case B6-98/13 - Funke/Springer Programmzeitschriften Bundeskartellamt Decision 25 April 2014, para. 138; 
Case B6-150/08 - Zeitungsverlag Schwäbisch Hall Bundeskartellamt Decision 21 April 2009, para. 33; Case 
AT.39398 - Visa MIF, Commission Decision, C(2019) 3034., para. 16. 
 
18 PIKE, Chris (2018). Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms, Part I. Introduction and key findings, 
OECD, (www.oecd.org/competition/rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms.htm, last accessed on 27 




further analyse these specifics.19 In the following paragraphs I will address the most important 
of these specifics. 
1.1. Network effects 
One of the characteristic features of multi-sided markets, which is not present in the one-
sided markets, is network externalities between different users (consumer groups) in the 
market.20 This feature is relevant for antitrust purposes only if its magnitude is significant and 
the nature of investigation suggests so.21 Nevertheless, if one decides not to take it into 
consideration when assessing a multi-sided platform, a reason must be given.22 
There are different network externalities, which will be further on referred to as positive, 
negative, direct and indirect network effects. Direct network effects are not as important for 
platform businesses, as they are same-side effects and essentially mean that “the value of a 
product or service for a user of one customer group depends on the presence of other users of 
the same customer group.”23 A good example of such an effect is one of having a phone. To 
put is simply – it is more attractive to own a phone if more people own a phone.  
On the other hand, indirect network effects are often used as a characteristic of multi-sided 
platforms. Indirect network effects occur in situations when “the value of a product or service 
for a user of one customer group depends on the presence of users of another customer 
 
19 BUNDESKARTELLAMT (2016). The Market Power of Platforms and Networks, Working Paper - B6-113/15, 
(https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Berichte/Think-Tank-Bericht-
Langfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, last accessed on 27 June 2021); See also 
MONOPOLKOMISSION (2015). Competition policy: the challenge of digital markets, Special Report No. 68 
(http://www.monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/SG/s68_fulltext_eng.pdf, last accessed on 27 June 2021).  
 
20 PIKE, Chris (2018). Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms, Part I. Introduction and key findings, 
OECD, (www.oecd.org/competition/rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms.htm, last accessed on 27 
June 2021), page 10.  
 
21 PIKE, Chris (2018). Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms, Part I. Introduction and key findings, 
OECD, (www.oecd.org/competition/rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms.htm, last accessed on 27 
June 2021), page 10.  
 
22 PIKE, Chris (2018). Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms, Part I. Introduction and key findings, 
OECD, (www.oecd.org/competition/rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms.htm, last accessed on 27 
June 2021), page 11.  
 
23 WISMER, Sebastian, BONGARD, Christian, RASEK, Arno (2017). Multi-Sided Market Economics in 





group.“24 To demonstrate this notion in case of Google Search - the more content providers 
(websites) join the platform, the more value it has for consumers, because they have wider 
choice. Vice versa, more consumers attract more advertisers, and more advertisers attract more 
content providers. The interdependency between different customer groups is evident, which 
leads platforms to notorious “chicken and egg” issue as described by Evans.25 This issue can 
be summarized as meaning that there needs to be enough Type A customers on the one side of 
the market to attract more Type B customers and vice versa.  
In case strong networks effects are present, they can create what is referred to as “feedback 
loops”. Within these loops, any action triggers a set of reactions, which increase the scope of 
the consequences of the actions.26 Taking Google as an example, if Google made its users pay 
for using its services, there would be less users, which would make it less attractive for 
advertisers to pay for the ads. This would lead to content providers earning less when their 
content is viewed and result in less quality content. Eventually, the decrease in the quality of 
the content would give less value to the users.  
1.2. Multi-homing 
Sometimes users use more than one of the rival multi-sided platforms simultaneously. This 
is referred to as multi-homing and can have effect on the overall competition. The more users 
tend to multi-home, the less competition for the customers there is. On the contrary, if there is 
a high number of users who single-home, it is an indicator that the competition for these 
customers is intense.27 Multi-homing can have several effects on competition, one of them 
 
24 WISMER, Sebastian, BONGARD, Christian, RASEK, Arno (2017). Multi-Sided Market Economics in 
Competition Law Enforcement, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 8, Issue 4, pages 257–
262. 
 
25 EVANS, David S. (2016). Multisided Platforms, Dynamic Competition, and the Assessment of Market Power 
for Internet-based Firms, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 753, page 7.  
 
26 PIKE, Chris (2018). Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms, Part I. Introduction and key findings, 
OECD, (www.oecd.org/competition/rethinking-antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms.htm, last accessed on 27 
June 2021), page 11.  
 
27 WISMER, Sebastian, RASEK, Arno (2017). Market definition in multi-sided markets, Directorate for Financial 
and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, OECD, 
(http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282017%2933/FI




being that it can reduce the impact of network effects.28 It is thus essential to establish whether 
consumers are prone to multi-homing when assessing the market power in particular market.  
1.3. Pricing  
The structure of pricing within multi-sided platforms is specific, as there is a need to get 
two customer groups on board, even though one group of the customers might be more price 
sensitive than the other one. This creates an interesting phenomenon, when in “multisided 
markets, one group of agents using the platform is usually subsidized by the platform, whereas 
the other group(s) of users pays for the services provided by the platform”.29 Taking Google 
Search as an example, consumers do not provide monetary compensation for using it (however, 
we can deduce that they are „paying“ with their data and attention), while advertisers are paying 
Google to promote their products and services.  
1.4. Tipping    
In general, tipping of the market occurs, when one player (multi-sided platform) finally 
dominates it.30 According to the literature, there are various factors which are facilitating market 
tipping – such as positive network effects, single-homing and switching costs.31 There are also 
factors which mitigate market tipping – such as negative network effects, multi-homing and 
innovation.32 As of now, there are no rules in place, which would directly address the issue of 
tipping and how to prevent it, on European Union level.33 One of the reasons why it is quite 
 
28 WISMER, Sebastian, BONGARD, Christian, RASEK, Arno (2017). Multi-Sided Market Economics in 
Competition Law Enforcement, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 8, Issue 4, pages 257–
262. 
 
29 GÜRKAYNAK, Gönenç, İNANILIR, Öznur, YAŞAR, Ayşe G. (2017). Multisided markets and the challenge 
of incorporating multisided considerations into competition law analysis, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 
Volume 5, Issue 1, April 2017, Pages 100–129.  
 
30 BEDRE-DEFOLIE, Özlem, NITSCHE, Rainer (2020). When Do Markets Tip? An Overview and Some Insights 
for Policy, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 11, Issue 10, Pages 610–622. 
 
31 BEDRE-DEFOLIE, Özlem, NITSCHE, Rainer (2020). When Do Markets Tip? An Overview and Some Insights 
for Policy, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 11, Issue 10, Pages 610–622. 
 
32 BEDRE-DEFOLIE, Özlem, NITSCHE, Rainer (2020). When Do Markets Tip? An Overview and Some Insights 
for Policy, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 11, Issue 10, Pages 610–622. 
 
33 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Press Release (2020). Antitrust: Commission consults stakeholders on a possible 





difficult to create regulation which would address the issue of tipping, is the nature of multi-
sided markets, which is very dynamic and prone to constant changes.  
1.5. Transaction and non-transaction multisided platforms 
In competition law literature, there is an established theoretical dichotomy between 
multisided platforms. One of the categories of multisided platforms is referred to as transaction 
and the other as non-transaction platform. Essentially, the difference stems from the way these 
platforms operate their business. Transaction platforms “are characterised by the presence and 
observability of a transaction between the two groups of platform users”34 whilst non-
transaction platforms “have no such transaction between the two sides”.35 This dichotomy has 
been used as a tool to access what comprises a relevant market36, however, nowadays, it is 
generally agreed among academics, that this dichotomy is no longer relevant for the assessment 
of the relevant market.  
Both categories, transaction and non-transaction multisided platforms, can have zero price 
side. Therefore, with regard to the definition of the relevant market especially in case of 
multisided markets where “one side” pays zero price37, such as Google, both sides of the 
multisided market and their effect on each other must be analysed.38 In order to establish 
relevant market in these conditions, hypothetical monopolist test may be used, even though the 
side of the market where the price is zero is present. This is possible when “competition on that 
side of the platform is on dimensions other than price” and it is possible to observe what 
happens on the market in case there are changes to these dimensions – for instance via SSNDQ 
 
34 GUNNAR, Niels (2019). Transaction versus non-transaction platforms: A false dichotomy in two-sided market 
definition, (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438913, last accessed on 27 June 2021), page 2.  
 
35 GUNNAR, Niels (2019). Transaction versus non-transaction platforms: A false dichotomy in two-sided market 
definition, (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438913, last accessed on 27 June 2021), page 2. 
 
36 GUNNAR, Niels (2019). Transaction versus non-transaction platforms: A false dichotomy in two-sided market 
definition, (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438913, last accessed on 27 June 2021), page 2. 
 
37 More precisely, one side of the multisided market is subsidized by the other one – in case of Google by 
advertising. Moreover, users pay by data and their attention, but no monetary compensation is present, therefore 
“zero price”.  
 
38 GUNNAR, Niels (2019). Transaction versus non-transaction platforms: A false dichotomy in two-sided market 




test (small but significant and non-transitory decrease in quality)39. Indeed, a quantification of 
these dimensions is undisputedly difficult, however, possible with enough experience and data. 
  
 
39 OECD, COMPETITION COMMITTEE (2013). The role and measurement of quality in competition analysis, 
Policy roundtables, (https://www.oecd.org/competition/Quality-in-competition-analysis-2013.pdf, last accessed 




2. Consumer harm in the digital markets  
The era of digitalisation has brought up multiple challenges not only for the competition 
law as such, but for the society as a whole. With “zero-price” markets on the rise, the 
understanding of consumer harm became much more complicated and complex. As already 
explained in Chapter 1, majority of the services offered on the digital market which often seem 
free are in reality “paid” by consumer’s personal data and advertising revenue.40 Therefore, 
analysing these new, fast-developing markets using solely – or – mainly price tools, may lead 
to the incorrect outcomes. Various academics argue that to evaluate consumer harm in these 
digital markets through non-price manner is the only right way, because “a competition analysis 
that is mainly or solely concerned with price, disregards elements that drive demand and supply 
in the digital economy.”41 
This is mainly because, when a service is perceived to be free by a consumer, price 
competition should not be of the greatest concern for competition authorities, as it will not be 
a criterion which will influence consumers. Therefore, the focus of (not only) competition 
authorities has shifted to non-price dimensions instead. However, when non-price dimensions 
are taken into the consideration when assessing consumer harm, it is quite difficult to quantify 
it. Some would even argue that when consumers are not complaining and service is offered “for 
free”, there should be no competition law enforcement necessary. However, this argument is 
clearly lacking any merit. Just because consumer harm is difficult to quantify in non-monetary 
dimension, or service is liked by the consumers, this does not mean that abusive conduct should 
not be examined and sanctioned – “[F]acts cannot be ignored simply because present methods 
do not permit them to be described and measured with full scientific rigor.”42 
Although it may seem like the Commission has shifted its focus from efficiency and price-
based competition to non-price criteria when accessing the anti-competitive conduct just fairly 
recently, that is not the case. The reason why it may appear so, is that the Commission often 
steers away from non-price dimension in its decisions, because these are difficult to quantify 
and thus non-price argumentation in these analyses may appear “weaker” or “less persuasive”. 
 
40 EVANS, David, S. (2019). Attention Platforms, the Value of Content, and Public Policy, Review of Industrial 
Organization, Volume 54, page 776.  
 
41 LUNDQVIST, Björn (2019). Competition Law For The Digital Economy. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, page 265.  
 
42 ANDERMAN, Steven, AVERITT, Neil W., BEHRENS, Peter, DE GHELLINCK, Elisabeth, GINSBURG, 
Douglas H., LANDE, Robert H., NIHOUL, Paul, ROSCH, Thomas J., STUCKE, Maurice, WRIGHT, Joshua D.  




Nevertheless, the Commission has addressed non-monetary competition throughout the years 
in various instances. For example, already in 2001 Mario Monti, as former EU Commissioner 
for Competition Policy, spoke on the importance of innovation and consumer choice as 
objectives of competition law. the Commission also stresses out in its Guidance with regard to 
the application of Art. 102 TFEU that “wider choice” and “improved goods and services”43 are 
of the essence during its enforcement activity.  The importance of assessment of these exact 
non-price criteria has been also recently raised by the current EU Commissioner for competition 
policy Vestager, who stated that the Commission must apply EU antitrust rules to ensure that 
companies “do not artificially deny European consumers as wide a choice as possible or stifle 
innovation.”44   
To sum up, in case consumer is not providing monetary compensation for the product or 
service offered, it is not possible to micro-economically calculate consumer surplus and 
therefore it is impossible to use SSNIP tests in a competition law analysis. This is the reason 
why test such as SSNDQ tests45 have emerged, which instead of the quantitative criteria focus 
on qualitative criteria in the competition analysis. Thus, due to the reasons established above, 
in our further analyses I will focus on qualitative criteria when establishing consumer harm - 
namely consumer choice and innovation. To do so, it is essential to first elaborate on these 
concepts while keeping in mind digital economy environment, which Google ecosystem is an 
impactful part of.  
2.1. Reducing consumer choice 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is understood that a consumer is the individual ultimate 
consumer, although the concept of consumer choice benefits the intermediate customers as 
 
43 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2, para. 
11.  
 
44 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Press Release (2015). Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to 
Google on comparison shopping service; opens separate formal investigation on Android, 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_4780, last accessed on 27 June 2021); EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, Why is competition policy important for consumers?, 
(https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html, last accessed on 27 June 2021). 
 
45 SSNDQ tests are tests which focus on Small but Significant Non-transitory Decrease in Quality, instead of Small 
but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP tests) when considering substitutability of the demand-
side or stipulating market definition. See OECD, COMPETITION COMMITTEE (2013). The role and 
measurement of quality in competition analysis, Policy roundtables, (https://www.oecd.org/competition/Quality-
in-competition-analysis-2013.pdf, last accessed on 27 June 2021). 
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well.46 Consumer choice includes both, efficiency and price approach. It embodies the idea that 
“consumers want books that reflect their interests, not just cheap books“47 – meaning that 
consumers are interested in more criteria when choosing a product or a service, not only price, 
but also non-price criteria - like quality or innovation. The notion of consumer choice is often 
misunderstood when used as a tool to assess anti-competitive behaviour, because it usually 
raises concerns that competitors instead of competition are meant to be protected by it. 
However, to maximize the number of options would be undesirable, as this approach would 
only overwhelm consumers with multitude of choices and lead to the poor allocation of 
resources. Concept of consumer choice is not meant to protect or raise the number of 
competitors or options - it is meant to “prohibit business conduct that harmfully and 
significantly limits the range of choices that the free market, absent the restraints being 
challenged, would have provided.“48 Therefore, it is not too concerned about the calculation of 
optimal number of choices, rather it focuses on whether the choice, which is of “practical 
importance” 49  for the consumer, is present. the Commission itself specifies that it does not 
have to prove that “there would have been greater competition”50 has the anticompetitive 
behaviour not been present. Literature51 suggests that, due to the vast differences between the 
industries, the optimal consumer choice in general sense cannot even be established. According 
to Averitt and his colleagues, there are three areas where consumer choice is far superior for 
the analysis than price.52 For the purposes of this thesis only one of them is relevant – the sphere, 
 
46 AVERITT, Neil W., LANDE, Robert H. (2007). Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law. 
Antitrust Law Journal, Volume 74, page 183. 
 
47 ANDERMAN, Steven, AVERITT, Neil W., BEHRENS, Peter, DE GHELLINCK, Elisabeth, GINSBURG, 
Douglas H., LANDE, Robert H., NIHOUL, Paul, ROSCH, Thomas J., STUCKE, Maurice, WRIGHT, Joshua D.  
(2016). Choice – A New Standard for Competition Law Analysis?. Concurrences Review, page 44.  
 
48 ANDERMAN, Steven, AVERITT, Neil W., BEHRENS, Peter, DE GHELLINCK, Elisabeth, GINSBURG, 
Douglas H., LANDE, Robert H., NIHOUL, Paul, ROSCH, Thomas J., STUCKE, Maurice, WRIGHT, Joshua D.  
(2016). Choice – A New Standard for Competition Law Analysis?. Concurrences Review, page 49. 
 
49 AVERITT, Neil W., LANDE, Robert H. (2007). Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law. 
Antitrust Law Journal, Volume 74, page 183.  
 
50 Case AT.40099 - Google Android, Commission Decision C(2018) 4761 final, para. 988.  
 
51 ANDERMAN, Steven, AVERITT, Neil W., BEHRENS, Peter, DE GHELLINCK, Elisabeth, GINSBURG, 
Douglas H., LANDE, Robert H., NIHOUL, Paul, ROSCH, Thomas J., STUCKE, Maurice, WRIGHT, Joshua D.  
(2016). Choice – A New Standard for Competition Law Analysis?. Concurrences Review, page 56. 
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Douglas H., LANDE, Robert H., NIHOUL, Paul, ROSCH, Thomas J., STUCKE, Maurice, WRIGHT, Joshua D.  




where “independent decision making and creativity, rather than price, are the main forms of 
competition.”53 This definition is applicable to Google in all the cases that will be discussed 
below, mainly because Google does not compete in terms of price in those cases. 
When quantifying the optimal consumer choice, “short-term considerations (involving the 
current array of choices on the market) as well as long-term goals (involving the optimal level 
of innovation)”54, must be considered. With regard to the number of choices present on the 
market, in general, consumers are able to pick what suits their demand in case there is more to 
choose from – in terms of quality, price, type etc. Nonetheless, to maximize the amount of 
choices is not desirable, as this would not be beneficial to the consumers, due to the poor 
allocation of resources, “buyers’ remorse” and ultimately higher prices. However, in case the 
competition in the market is not affected by the anticompetitive conduct, free market will create 
this “optimal level of consumer choice”55 on its own. The importance of innovation will be 
discussed below. 
2.2. Stifling innovations 
Generally, the importance of innovations for economic growth and competition law is 
undisputed. It is therefore not surprising Schumpeter argued that „innovation and economic 
growth are essentially the same thing”56. Despite this, competition authorities in their analyses 
often focus primarily on static efficiency instead of dynamic efficiency, as it is much easier to 
quantify and therefore leads to a “clearer” analysis. From economic standpoint, economists’ 
opinions vary when it comes to competition in connection with innovation. Some argue that 
innovative effort increases when the market is less competitive and more concentrated – for 
instance Schumpeter57 - claiming that when competition decreases, companies can “focus more 
 
53 ANDERMAN, Steven, AVERITT, Neil W., BEHRENS, Peter, DE GHELLINCK, Elisabeth, GINSBURG, 
Douglas H., LANDE, Robert H., NIHOUL, Paul, ROSCH, Thomas J., STUCKE, Maurice, WRIGHT, Joshua D.  
(2016). Choice – A New Standard for Competition Law Analysis?. Concurrences Review, page 60. 
 
54 ANDERMAN, Steven, AVERITT, Neil W., BEHRENS, Peter, DE GHELLINCK, Elisabeth, GINSBURG, 
Douglas H., LANDE, Robert H., NIHOUL, Paul, ROSCH, Thomas J., STUCKE, Maurice, WRIGHT, Joshua D.  
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56 WU, Tim (2012), Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered Most, Antitrust 
Law Journal, Vol. 78, page 313. 
 
57 SCHUMPETER, Joseph A. (1976). Socialism, capitalism and democracy, Harper and Brothers (5th edn, George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd). 
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on post-innovation and research and development processes rather than price and output 
competition in the market.”58 On the other hand, economists like Arrow argue that it is the 
competitive pressure that incentivizes companies to innovate as monopolists are less keen to 
invest in product innovations, because it would cannibalize their own product.59  
As the nature of internet itself holds great potential to innovate, competition in digital 
markets works differently than in traditional markets. Unquestionably, innovation plays a key 
role in digital economy where incumbents often possess significant market shares, because it 
can be used as a tool to overcome barriers to entry created on the market by network effects 
and data.60  
2.3. Factors influencing consumer choice and innovations 
For the purposes of the upcoming analyses, I have chosen following criteria, which, when 
present on the market together, seem to lead to the consumer harm exhibited in terms of stifling 
innovations and reducing consumer choice.  
2.3.1. Acquisitions 
The topic of “killer acquisitions”, especially in connection to the anti-competitive practices 
of big tech companies, has been a subject of many rather heated debates throughout the previous 
years. Especially with regard to the “killer acquisitions” 61. To my knowledge, there is no 
statistic regarding the number of “killer acquisitions” which took place in the digital market 
sphere, however there is one in pharmaceutical sector, which estimates that “more than 6% of 
acquisitions every year in that sector are „killer acquisitions.“62 Nevertheless, the number of 
 
 
58 KOKKORIS, Ioannis (2020). Innovation considerations in merger control and unilateral conduct enforcement, 
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Volume 8, Issue 1, page 58. 
 
59 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016). EU Merger Control and Innovation, Competition Policy Brief, 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_en.pdf, last accessed on 27 June 2021).  
 
60 BUNDESKARTELLAMT (2016). The Market Power of Platforms and Networks, Working Paper - B6-113/15, 
(https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Berichte/Think-Tank-Bericht-
Langfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, last accessed on 27 June 2021), page 56. 
 
61 Acquisitions of (mostly) start-ups carried out by the incumbent firms with the intent of discontinuing the 
acquired product or service in order to ease the innovative pressure.  
 
62 Understandably, the nature of pharmaceutical sector is way different, so this number is only illustrational. See 
COYLE, Diana, FLETCHER, Amelia, MARSDEN, Philip, MCAULEY, Derek, FURMAN, Jason (2019). 
Unlocking digital competition, Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, 
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these acquisitions is not that important, because even one acquisition which would contain 
significant disruptive innovation could be hugely harmful to the incentives to innovate and 
innovation and/or consumer choice. 
Only in the past 10 years, five biggest tech companies Google, Amazon, Microsoft, 
Facebook and Apple have acquired over 400 other companies.63 Since 1987 until 2019, out of 
all of the acquisitions of these five companies, Google has the biggest share on completed 
acquisitions, around 32%.64 This is slightly alarming when considered in the light of the fact 
that out of 175 acquisitions made by Google, Amazon, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft that 
have been analysed by Gautier and Lamesch „in 105 cases the brand of the target firms was 
discontinued within a year of the acquisition”65. Indeed, this does not mean that the competition 
concerns do not arise even when the product or service is not discontinued after the 
acquisition66, however that it is a usual “killer acquisition” strategy. Lowering of incentives to 
innovate caused by the nascent acquisitions is apparent already, as there is “a decline in Venture 
Capital funding for starts ups in the ‘same space’ as the companies acquired by Google and 
Facebook“.67 
The necessity to intervene and address these “killer acquisitions” has been recently partially 
satisfied by the new guidance68 provided by Commission on 26 March 2021, which focuses on 
 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unloc
king_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf, last accessed on 27 June 2021), page 48. 
 
63 COYLE, Diana, FLETCHER, Amelia, MARSDEN, Philip, MCAULEY, Derek, FURMAN, Jason (2019). 
Unlocking digital competition, Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unloc
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(2019). The Record of Weak U.S. Merger Enforcement in Big Tech, American Antitrust Institute, 
(https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Merger-Enforcement_Big-Tech_7.8.19.pdf, last 
accessed on 27 June 2021), page 5.  
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Institute, (https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Merger-Enforcement_Big-
Tech_7.8.19.pdf, last accessed on 27 June 2021), page 5.  
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(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3529012, last accessed on 27 June 2021), page 23. 
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the amendment of the application of the referral mechanism established in Article 22 EUMR69. 
In short, this guidance enables National Competition Authorities to refer to the Commission 
even the mergers which do not meet the national merger thresholds. This shift in regulation is 
especially important in innovative fields, such as big tech, where start-up companies usually 
did not have time to generate significant turnover yet and therefore the acquisition of these new 
companies would not be caught under the turnover threshold. This amendment seems like one 
step closer to the elimination of acquisitions which are a threat to the competition on the merits.  
However, not all acquisitions performed by big tech are anticompetitive – it is well-known 
that “being acquired is an important exit strategy for technology start-ups.”70 Assuming all 
acquisitions by big tech are anticompetitive or harmful to consumers would highly likely only 
stifle innovation, as many start-ups would lose incentive to innovate and new start-ups would 
not appear so often. Therefore, only time will show whether this shift in the assessment of the 
mergers will negatively influence the number of mergers and perhaps even the numbers of start-
ups present in the EEA market, because companies may see this shift as an element of legal 
uncertainty. 
2.3.2. Exclusionary conduct 
To keep the competitive pressure in the digital sector, it is essential to protect innovations. 
While promoting innovations by monopolists or oligopolists is important, it is suggested by the 
literature71 that it is mainly the innovation created by small players which must be encouraged 
the most, because those are more likely to bring disruptive innovation rather than a planned 
one.72 This is one of the reasons why exclusionary conduct is “the real supreme evil”73 – it 
discourages external disruptive innovations. According to Wu, “exclusion, if cheap enough, is 
 
69 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation). 
 
70 COYLE, Diana, FLETCHER, Amelia, MARSDEN, Philip, MCAULEY, Derek, FURMAN, Jason (2019). 
Unlocking digital competition, Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, 
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actually an alternative to innovation, particularly for a monopolist.“74 Thus, competition 
authorities must make exclusionary practices expensive in order to protect innovation 
incentives.75  
Moreover, in case exclusionary conduct takes place on the market, consumer choice takes 
a blow, because instead of the market itself establishing the optimal consumer choice, it is the 
exclusionary conduct which influences the number and overall variety of choices present on the 
market.  
2.3.3. High barriers to entry 
Barriers to entry prevent new entrants from accessing the market, which is beneficial for 
the incumbents, because competitive pressure is diluted. However, this inevitably stifles 
innovation and hampers consumer choice, because new entrants are unable to join the market. 
There are various notions which are regarded as barriers to entry, however in the analyses 
below I will focus specifically on data and network effects as barriers to entry.   
Incumbents in the digital sectors, using their first mover advantage, were already able to 
obtain vast amounts of data, which created an advantage over their competitors. This advantage 
is usually very difficult to compensate for, even though it is often argued that data is not a finite 
source and therefore cannot pose as a barrier to entry, when the data collection is substantial 
and the competitors are unable to get access to the same kind of data as incumbents, or it is too 
expensive for them to buy that collection of data, it is a different story. 
Furthermore, indirect network effects often serve as barriers to entry. In case of Google 
Search, the higher is the number of consumers using the search engine, the higher is the number 
of advertisers. This leads to a higher revenue and Google can afford to invest more into the 
development of the search engine, to make it even more attractive for users. Moreover, data 
that are provided by the consumers in exchange for “free” usage of the search engine can be 
used by Google to improve its services.76 Therefore, due to the network effects creating 
feedback loops, it is much more difficult for new competitors to enter the market.  
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3. First case study – Google Shopping77 
3.1. Factual background 
When searching for information via Google Search, two types of results appear in front of 
its users. Firstly, there are unpaid - or so called “organic” search results78 – these are the “blue 
links” redirecting users to third party websites. Secondly, at the top of the page, there are 
specialised search results79, which provide users with specific results grouped intentionally by 
product, service or information (for instance “Google Maps”, “Google Finance” or “Google 
Video”), depending on the original user’s query.  
In 2002, Google introduced a new specialised search service, called Froogle (since 2012 
rebranded to Google Shopping), which is a comparison-shopping service that allows consumers 
to compare prices and products across the online world. In general, it is a well-known fact, that 
comparison-shopping services are highly dependent on the amount of traffic they receive from 
users.80 It is a simple equation – more traffic means more clicks, which leads to the higher 
revenue. Moreover, higher traffic is more attractive to retailers interested into listing their offers 
with a given comparison-shopping service. Additionally, the number of searches helps to 
improve the accuracy of the search results – because algorithm is “learning”. 
All the above-mentioned facts lead to the conclusion that Google holds nowadays a very 
unique position, as a “gatekeeper of the internet” since it is dominant in general internet search 
and majority of user’s queries pass through its search engine. Therefore, majority of users will 
most likely get to the individual comparison-shopping services through Google Search.  
 When Froogle entered the market, there already have been other price comparison-service 
providers established on the market. Initially, Froogle encompassed multiple types of retailers 
– manufacturers, re-sellers and platforms – all of them initially did not have to pay to be listed 
in it.81 Google’s internal document from 2006 proves that Froogle did not perform well at first.82 
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Not only was it not gaining traffic, but it was also losing traffic.83 However, this has changed, 
when Google changed its design of Froogle through the introduction of Product Universal and 
intense algorithm adjustments. 
At first, in April 2007 Froogle has been renamed to “Google Product Search”. On top of 
that, as mentioned above, Google created “Product Universal” – now rebranded to “Shopping 
Unit”84 - which “comprised specialised search results from Google Product Search, 
accompanied by one or several images and additional information such as the price of the 
relevant items.“85 
Then it all began in 2008, when Google has significantly changed its business strategy, 
pushing its comparison search service in front of the ones of the competitors via algorithm.86 
This strategy was feasible and successful because of Google’s dominance in general internet 
search market.87 
In 2010 the Commission initiated antitrust investigation into Google’s conduct, after 
receiving complaints from two rival vertical search service providers, claiming that Google is 
treating their comparison search services unfavourably, while preferentially displaying its own 
services.88 
Meanwhile, in 2012 Google changed both Google Shopping and Shopping Unit to purely 
commercial (paid) listing model, with only merchants being able to sign up to be listed (not 
comparison-shopping services).89 
Since the beginning of the investigation, the Commission was very clear that it was trying 
to reach a binding commitments decision instead of taking more restrictive measures.90 Google 
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offered several rounds of commitments, which were further subjected to the market tests.91 
Although from the statement of former Commissioner Almunia in October 201392 and February 
201493 it seemed like these commitments were able to address all the competition concerns, 
complainants and politicians intensely critiqued them. The strongest opposition entailed 
commitment regarding paid listings in Google’s specialised search service, as the competitors 
would have to participate in dedicated auction mechanism to appear in the paid results.94 These 
circumstances and overall dissatisfaction with commitments from the complainants, combined 
with new market data and further considerations by competitors, led the Commission to the 
decision of continuing with the investigation.  
In April 2015, the Commission sent Statement of Objections to Google regarding abuse of 
its dominant position in general internet search market by treating preferentially its own vertical 
search service (Google Shopping) in its general search results.95 
After 7 years of antitrust investigation into Google Shopping, in June 2017, the 
Commission imposed an unprecedented fine of €2.42 billion on Google for abusing its 
dominant position in the relevant market for general search in the EEA.96 
3.2. Summary of the decision 
The Commission has found that Google has been using its dominant position in the market 
of general search as a leverage in vertical search market – more precisely - in comparison 
shopping service market, by two types of conduct: 1) assigning a prominent placement to its 
own comparison-shopping service whilst 2) demoting rival comparison-shopping services in 
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its search results.97 According to Commissioner Vestager, this conduct denied competitors the 
opportunity to compete on the merits and innovate, and, more importantly – denied European 
consumers “a genuine choice of services and the full benefits of innovation".98  
3.3. Analysis  
Although the majority of academic contributions focus on how the dominance has been 
established in this case, in the following paragraphs I will address a little bit less-discussed topic 
of consumer harm. I will try to establish whether it was Google’s conduct that has stifled 
innovation and limited consumer choice, or whether it was the allegedly interventional 
approach of the Commission.  
3.3.1. The abusive conduct  
The conduct, which has been found to be abusive, consists of Google displaying its own 
comparison-shopping service prominently at the top of the page in its general search results 
pages with pictures and in rich text format (in Shopping Unit). Meanwhile, other comparison-
shopping services were only allowed to appear in its generic search results99, which are 
subjected to different ranking algorithms. These algorithms however never applied to Google’s 
own comparison-shopping service, which eventually influenced how the comparison-shopping 
services were further displayed in Google’s general search. Due to this conduct, diversion of 
traffic occurred, as Google’s behaviour decreased traffic from its general search results to other 
comparison-shopping services, while increasing traffic from Google’s general search results to 
its own comparison-shopping service. This conduct was found to be out of the scope of 
competition on the merits and the Commission held that it is “capable of having, or likely to 
have, anti-competitive effects in the national markets for comparison shopping services and 
general search services.”100  
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Thus, it was decided that Google has foreclosed its rivals in comparison shopping service 
market, which according to the Commission stifled innovation and limited consumer choice.101 
The reasoning behind this conclusion is that innovations may be less likely, as competing 
comparison services may be less incentivized to invest into their development, when they are 
being made artificially less visible and therefore losing much needed traffic. Regarding the 
consumer choice, the Commission held that it has been negatively influenced, as instead of 
providing the most relevant results, Google promoted its own comparison-shopping service, 
displaying it at the top of the page no matter whether it consisted of the most relevant results.  
Google objects to these conclusions, claiming that Shopping Unit is an innovative tool that 
is supposed to provide “highest quality information”102 to consumers.  
3.3.2. Consumer harm 
Competition enforcement is well acquainted with the price related consumer harm 
violations with regard to the specific product or service. It is necessary to acknowledge here, 
that while price is traditionally undoubtedly very important criterion in the competitive 
analysis, it is simply not to be solely or primarily focused on in our case – because “while in 
other industries reducing costs can be a major source of competitive advantage, this is often 
less the case in the digital world.”103 This notion is also observable from Google Shopping 
case as such. In this decision, the Commission´s attention has refocused from price related 
criteria towards non-monetary parameters in multiple instances – for example – when 
establishing whether Google is dominant, it did not look into whether Google is able to 
“profitably increase prices above the competitive level for a significant period of time”104, 
instead, it was the finding that “a significant number of users would not switch to competing 
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providers were Google to degrade the quality of its general search service”105, which the 
Commission based its reasoning on. This shift is understood by several authors106 as perhaps 
necessary in case of digital markets, which are highly innovative in their essence. 
In Google Shopping decision, one of the Commission´s greatest concerns regarding the 
consumer harm was that when Google displays results to the consumers´ queries, they might 
not get the most relevant results when searching for a product, because the most relevant 
comparison-shopping services would not be displayed so prominently (as they could not appear 
in Shopping Unit). This conduct leads to the hampering of consumer choice as consumers 
assume that the higher the result appears on the webpage, the more relevant it is107 and thus do 
not click on the results which are displayed less attractively. Therefore, because of the Google’s 
exclusionary conduct, consumers do not see the results which are the most relevant displayed 
most prominently, only the results that Google wants them to see. This causes the diversion of 
traffic from other comparison-shopping services to Google’s. 
Even though in its decision, the Commission does not precisely use the words 
“consumer choice”, these words are used later by Commissioner Vestager during the Press 
Conferences when describing the anti-competitive effects which Google´s conduct had.108 By 
contrast, the wording of the decision describes Google´s conduct as “likely to reduce the ability 
of consumers to access the most relevant comparison-shopping services”109.  And that is one of 
the meanings of what limiting consumer choice means. Protecting consumer choice is not about 
creating and keeping as many options as possible, or quantifying the optimal or ideal number 
of choices, it is about refraining from any activity which would impact the way consumer choice 
is exhibited and thus optimal consumer choice established.110 It was known to Google that 
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consumers preferred and clicked more often on the results which were displayed higher in the 
general search result page111, while assuming that they are clicking on the most relevant result 
to their query. Using this knowledge, Google not only promoted its own comparison search 
service by displaying its results above general search, but also demoted other comparison 
services by algorithms which did not apply to its own comparison tool. Therefore, because of 
Google’s clearly exclusionary conduct, optimal consumer choice of comparison-shopping 
services could not be present in the market. 
In its submission112, Google claimed that consumer choice is not influenced, because 
consumers, due to the algorithms applied, still get the most relevant results within Shopping 
Unit just as they would be getting the most relevant results within generic search results, 
however, that is not even disputed by the Commission.113 As can be deducted from the words 
of the decision itself: “The Commission does not object to Google applying certain relevance 
standards but to the fact that Google's own comparison shopping service is not subject to those 
same standards as competing comparison shopping services.“114 Although, in any event, the 
Commission further concludes that Google has never demonstrated that these relevancy 
standards have been put in place and upheld in case of Shopping Unit.115 
What Google seems to be consciously ignoring is that not all the offers available on the 
market were allowed to participate in the Shopping Unit (which has the most prominent 
display), at the time of anti-competitive conduct, and until recently only merchant platforms 
could partake in the Shopping Unit (which was unavailable to comparison-price service 
providers). Thus, Google has effectively reduced optimal consumer choice, which would have 
been present in the market, in case its exclusionary conduct would have been absent.  
Subsequently, according to the decision, the very same conduct of Google also lowered 
competitors´ incentives to innovate. Although the Commission and Commissioner Vestager116 
herself considers innovation to be one of the very important non-price factors to be taken into 
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account when assessing anti-competitive effects of abusive conduct, Google Search decision 
provides almost no in-depth evaluation of this criterion. Only three paragraphs out of total 755 
deal directly with the issue of innovation, thus the analysis is anything but extensive in this 
regard. The Commission also does not stipulate clear criteria to follow when innovation 
considerations arise. 
However, the reason why rival comparison-shopping services were less incentivized to 
invest and innovate in this case is being reasoned by the visibility argument. The Commission 
held that even if rival product would be the most relevant, it would not be displayed as 
prominently as Google´s Shopping Unit, ultimately leading to gaining less traffic.117 This 
argumentation is supported by “the eye-tracking tests”118, one of which found that “[o]n 
average, the first three links seem to account for 40-65% of the total clicks on desktop devices. 
On mobile devices, this tendency is even more accentuated, with the top three links on average 
accounting for more than 70% of the total clicks. The evidence suggests that […] consumers 
seem to display an inherent bias to click on links in higher positions”.119 Thus, the Commission 
argues in its decision, that comparison shopping services will have incentive to innovate only 
if „they can reasonably expect that their services will be able to attract a sufficient volume of 
user traffic“.120  The Commission also admits that there are ways for a traffic to be artificially 
increased by simply purchasing it, however, that would lead to lower revenues and less 
available resources to be further invested in innovations and improvement of quality overall.121  
When challenged with the alleged stifling of innovation, Google´s reaction was that 
there is “a ton of innovation”122 in the market, arguing that if there was no competitive pressure 
and the market would be dominated by Google, there would be none.123 This approach comes 
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as no surprise, because even in the past, Google´s position used to be that “competition is just 
one click away”.124 Nevertheless, this rather controversial statement can be easily debunked 
using the argumentation provided in the Google Shopping decision which found that consumers 
are unlikely to multi-home even if Google degrades its quality125 and the fact, that there are 
high barriers to entry. These barriers to entry are quite specific in Google Shopping case, 
because as established above, Google has been using its acquired data and pre-existing feedback 
loops from the general search engine market to gain an advantage in the comparison-shopping 
market. Therefore, no other comparison-shopping service could have the same starting position 
because it would not have either the amount of data necessary either the feedback loops from 
network effects working in its favour. 
 While Google´s 100-page response to the Commission´s Statement of Objections is 
completely confidential, in its blogposts Google´s former vice president and current senior vice 
president argue that all that Google did was to simply innovate and improve quality for the 
benefit of consumers. Arguing that even the introduction of Shopping Unit stems from its 
“commitment to quality”126 and that its conduct does not qualify as “favouring” of its own 
service, but rather as “listening to its customers”.127  This approach is visible from almost all 
the statements provided by Google´s representatives – using its customers as a defence. 
However, it is difficult to accommodate the notion that this conduct benefits consumers, mainly 
because the so-called innovation is eliminating competitors by hampering their traffic and 
discouraging them to innovate, which leads to the consumers being deprived of the benefits of 
choice and innovation. Benefit to consumers is even more questionable when put into the 
context of a research which shows approximately 55 % of consumers are unaware of which 
links provided as results to a query are ads.128 Moreover, only 50% of all adults know 
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advertising is the main source of funding for search engines.129 It seems difficult to 
accommodate the idea that consumers benefit from a system which they do not have an essential 
grasp on. 
Additionally, Google acquired in the previous years at least two comparison-site 
companies in the comparison-site market, which ceased to exist shortly after their acquisition. 
In 2010 Google acquired Like.com and in 2015 this comparison-shopping site became defunct. 
Afterwards, in 2011 Google acquired only 1 year old comparison-shopping site Sparkbuy and, 
as a part of the purchase deal, site was closed. Now, these may have surely been only talent or 
technology acquisitions, but they still raise concerns. And while many would argue that since 
Alphabet spent from 2006 until 31 March 2021 over 28.238 billion USD in research and 
development130, it is a huge innovator, however, incumbents are unlikely to bring “disruptive” 
new innovations, especially if it could hurt their already existing business model. Therefore, 
there is still a risk, that these companies with billions in revenue could always rather acquire  
these (disruptive) innovators (and perhaps even discontinue the nascent product) which could 
sabotage their business model, than try to compete with them.  
3.3.3. Problematic implementation of the remedy 
To allow Google´s competitors in comparison-shopping services to at least have a 
chance to compete, the Commission ordered Google to treat these competitors´ comparison-
shopping services equally as Google treats its own. More precisely, the Commission held that 
“Google has to apply the same processes and methods to position and display rival comparison-
shopping services in Google's search results pages as it gives to its own comparison-shopping 
service.”131 Google decided that it will therefore create an auction-based system where all the 
comparison-shopping sites could compete via bidding, including Google´s new business unit 
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with its own budget, which was supposed to run Google Shopping in Europe. However, this 
has not been met with positive reactions from other comparison-shopping sites, which argued 
that Google´s new business unit is nothing more than internal accounting stunt and nothing has 
changed, because the lucrative placement within the search results is yet again not achieved by 
the relevancy criteria (and competition on the merits), but rather by the fact who can pay the 
most. Therefore, it seemed that the Commission’s remedy did not restore the competition on 
the merits, and it appeared that the rival comparison-shopping sites were still disincentivized to 
innovate and consumer choice was still harmed, as the relevancy rating has not been 
established. 
Since 21 April 2020 Google implemented changes which allowed merchants to 
advertise via Google Shopping tab132 (Shopping Unit) for free under the “Products” slot. 
However, the change of the conditions did not apply to the comparison-shopping sites, which 
nowadays have a dedicated slot within Shopping Unit and still have to participate in an auction 
in order to appear in this dedicated “Comparison sites” slot.133  Therefore, it is questionable 
whether this new change will benefit comparison shopping sites at all, because they still have 
to bid in an auction, however, consumers now have to counterintuitively click on the 
“Comparison sites” slot displayed in Shopping Unit (which is displayed within the general 
search results at the top of the page) in order to even see their ads. I suspect that this 
implementation of the remedy will yet again be met with a lot of criticism, because I assume 
that traffic will be diverted to merchant websites via Google’s Shopping Unit and other 
comparison-shopping services will go without being noticed by the majority of the consumers. 
Moreover, merchants will highly likely rather pay Google to appear in the “Products” slot 
within the Shopping Unit, than pay other comparison-shopping services to appear on their 
“Comparison sites” slot, which is less likely to be seen by the consumers. This implementation 
therefore likely reduces the choice of merchants and consumers to use other comparison-
shopping services than Google Shopping even more.134 Only time and shifts on the market will 
show whether this assumption is true. 
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In the analysis above, I have considered the argumentation of both sides present in 
Google Search decision in the light of the facts and came to the conclusion that not only 
Google´s conduct does not promote innovations on the market for comparison-shopping 
services, but it is also able to contribute to stifling them. This determent of innovations further 
hampers consumer choice, as competition through innovation, which is especially important in 
the digital markets, is almost impossible for the competitors. Moreover, absent the anti-
competitive conduct of Google, consumer´s access to the most relevant results could have been 
present and consumer choice not affected. Thus, due to its anti-competitive conduct Google has 
effectively restricted consumer choice and reduced rivals’ incentives to innovate, which 
inevitably led to consumer harm. 
Therefore, it can be determined, that when there is a dominant platform which enters a 
new adjacent market where barriers to entry are high and this dominant platform engages in 
anti-competitive (exclusionary conduct) on this new market (perhaps even carries out 
acquisitions which are concerning from the competition law point of view) consumer harm in 
terms of stifling innovation and reducing consumer choice seems inevitable.   
Although the interference of the Commission was necessary in order to amend the 
competition on the merits in the market of comparison-shopping services, it does not seem like 
the behavioural remedy which was set out in the decision delivered the desired results. 
However, it does not appear like it is the Commission to blame for the unsatisfactory outcome, 
it seems like it is Google who voluntarily disregarded the criteria stipulated by the decision and 
implemented them in a way which did not restore the competition on the merits, ultimately 
leading yet again to consumer harm. Since April 2020 Google tweaked its implementation of 
the remedy, however, so far it seems like competition on the merits has not been restored and 
comparison-shopping sites still do not enjoy equal treatment – if anything, their position seems 
to have worsened. 
Google has appealed this decision; the first hearing has taken place at the General Court 
in Luxembourg from 12-14 February 2020. The main argumentation of Google was based on 
the notion that decision of the Commission was a refusal to supply case and that the 
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Commission “had failed to satisfy the applicable legal tests for such a determination”.135 This 
argument rises an interesting debate with regard to the rethinking of the essential facilities 
doctrine within the digital space, however many argue that “Google’s duty to supply argument 
relies upon an incorrect interpretation of the decision”136, as the decision does not oblige 
Google to provide technology to its competitors. Nevertheless, there are still other claims on 
which Google could prevail and persuade the panel of judges, one of them being a lack of causal 
link between its alleged anti-competitive behaviour and the loss of traffic of its competitors. 
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4. Second case study – Google Android137  
4.1. Factual background 
Back in the early 2000s there was a rather significant change in the dynamics of how 
people began to browse the internet, essentially because consumers started to prefer to use 
mobile devices instead of the desktop PCs. Google realized already back then, that in order to 
stay relevant in general search and thus keep the Google Search still relevant, it needed to 
prepare for this shift in preferences of its users. Google Search is an essential tool for Google, 
because via this tool Google generates massive revenues. Presumably, with this anticipation in 
mind, Google acquired the developer of Android mobile operating system in 2005. Android is 
“an open-source operating system for mobile devices”138, therefore its code is available to 
everyone for free. In case anyone decides to download this code and modify it, a so-called 
Android fork is created.139 
Since 2008, Google provides an app store for Android, called Play Store. The specific 
characteristic of Play Store is that it cannot be downloaded like other apps, it needs to be pre-
installed. It is essential to have an app store installed on a device, in order to be able to download 
other apps, which were not pre-installed. Therefore, Play Store is visited by the consumers quite 
often.140 And while pre-installation of other app stores is not prohibited by Google, it is not 
possible for developers to use Play Store for the distribution of the different app stores.141 
Approximately since 2011, Google went ahead and pre-installed Google Search 
application “on practically all Android devices sold in the EEA”.142 Similarly, as of 2012, 
Google decided to pre-install, on basically all Android devices which were sold within the EEA, 
its web browser Google Chrome, with its default search engine being Google Search. As a result 
of this practice, manufacturers were able to obtain Google’s mobile applications only as a 
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bundle including app store Play Store, Google Search app as well as Google Chrome web 
browser.  
Around the same time period, Google reached out to several big manufacturers and 
mobile network operators (“MNOs”), and offered them financial benefits, in case of exclusive 
pre-installation of Google Search app on their Android devices. Furthermore, Google has 
informed manufacturers that if they wanted to pre-install Google’s proprietary apps (like Play 
Store or Google Search), they could not do so on Android forks.  
Ten years after the acquisition of Android by Google, in April 2015, the Commission 
has sent Statement of Objections to Google, informing it of the initiation of its investigation 
regarding Android in connection with its alleged anti-competitive agreements, which were 
supposed to constrain the market for operating systems and applications.143 One year later, in 
April 2016, the Commission decided to engage in formal antitrust proceedings.  
This time it took the Commission “only” two years to conclude, that Google abused its 
dominant position. And in case the fine for the breach of competition rules in Google Shopping 
case has been eyebrow-raising for some, this time it was almost breath taking for majority – as 
a fine of 4.34 billion euros has been imposed on Google.  
4.2. Summary of the decision 
The Commission has found that Google abused its dominant position when it imposed 
various restrictions on manufacturers as well as on MNOs. Google’s conduct has led to the 
increased usage of Google Search, which allowed Google to secure its dominant position in the 
general search. The conduct in question consisted of three separate practices constituting one 
infringement. These practices are: 1) tying Google Search app and Google Chrome with 
Android operating system, 2) financial compensation to the manufacturers for the exclusive 
pre-installation of Google Search app and 3) prohibition of the pre-installation of Google apps 
on Android forks.  
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4.3.1. The abusive conduct 
As mentioned above, the conduct which constituted an infringement of competition law 
in the eyes of the Commission consisted of three separate practices. All three of these practices 
are in their nature contractual restrictions. 
Firstly, Google engaged in two instances of illegal tying of its applications, which 
resulted in Google offering its applications for Android only as a bundle including Play Store, 
Google Search app as well as Google Chrome browser. First instance of tying occurred when 
Google tied Google Search app to Play Store, which in practical terms meant that in order to 
have Play Store pre-installed on an Android device, Google Search app had to be pre-installed 
on the device as well. This pre-installation leads to the so-called “status quo bias”144 which 
essentially means that although consumers are not forced to use pre-installed apps and can install 
new and different apps, they are highly unlikely to do so.145 Second instance of tying occurred 
when Google decided to tie Google Chrome browser with Play Store and Google Search app.  
In practise this meant that Play Store and Google Search app could not have been installed 
without Google Chrome browser being pre-installed as well. This was one of the essential steps, 
because Google Chrome’s default search engine is Google Search. The above-mentioned 
conduct according to the Commission’s conclusions harms the competition because it “provides 
Google with a significant competitive advantage” and helps Google to cement its dominant 
position in general search. Moreover, it increases barriers to entry146, reduces incentives to 
innovate of other general search service providers147 and directly or indirectly harms users, who 
“as a result of Google's interference with the normal competitive process, may see less choice 
of general search services available”.148  
Secondly, Google engaged in exclusivity payments towards MNOs and largest device 
manufacturers. These payments were granted as a compensation for the exclusive pre-
installation of Google Search on all Android devices, while no other rival general search engine 
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could have been pre-installed. The payments were “revenue-based portfolio payments”149, and 
the Commission found them to restrict competition, which led to the deterrence of innovation – 
not only in competing general search services, but Google Search was not incentivized to 
improve its quality as well. This anti-competitive conduct also actively resulted in less choice150 
of general search services present on the market on Android devices, because there were very 
few devices with other general search service than Google Search available.   
Lastly, Google imposed anti-fragmentation agreements (AFAs) on those who wanted to 
pre-install either Google Search app or Play Store on Android devices. Although there is no 
definition of what actually “fragmentation” constitutes within the meaning of AFAs151, in 
practice it means that none of Google’s proprietary apps (like Google Search app or Play Store) 
could have been installed on devices running on Android forks152. The Commission has found 
that these AFAs are restricting competition, mostly because Android forks, which were 
perceived as a gateway to innovation and “credible competitive threat”153 have been effectively 
eliminated from competition. This is mainly because Android without its proprietary apps – such 
as Play Store – is unattractive for consumers. In conclusion, the Commission determined that 
this conduct helps Google to reinforce its dominant position in general search, “deters 
innovation, and tends to harm, directly or indirectly, consumers.”154 
4.3.2. Consumer harm 
As well as in the analysis of Google Search decision, in the analysis of Google Android 
decision, I will be addressing innovation and consumer choice as two important qualitative 
factors which are affected by the anti-competitive conduct of Google. I will address all the 
above-mentioned anti-competitive practices in an order which we have established in the 
previous paragraphs. 
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 Firstly, regarding the two instances of tying Google Search with Play Store, the 
Commission established, similarly to Google Search decision, that it is very important for rival 
general search services to obtain as much traffic (generated by users’ queries) as possible, in 
order to have incentive to innovate and be able to improve their services. It is an easy equation 
- the more data general search services gain, the better user experience they can provide later 
on.155 However, due to the obligatory pre-installation of Google Search app and Google 
Chrome, it was highly unlikely for competitors to gain a sufficient amount of traffic. In its 
defence, Google claimed that users are not forced to use already pre-installed Google Search 
app, because nothing is stopping them from downloading a different general search application. 
In reaction to this argument the Commission concludes that even though there is no obligation 
or necessity to use pre-installed service, there is an empirically proved “status quo bias”156, 
meaning that consumers are “unlikely to look for, download, and use alternative apps, at least 
when the app that is pre-installed […] already delivers the required functionality.”157 
Therefore, by tying Play Store with Google Search app as well as Google Chrome browser, 
Google used an exclusionary tactic to successfully avoid and dilute the innovative pressure. As 
already established, the innovative pressure is of great importance especially in the digital 
markets. Therefore, the Commission concluded, that in case tying has not been taking place 
even “Google may have improved Google Chrome to a greater degree.”158  
Moreover, restricting competition by this conduct leaves consumers with less choice of 
general search services and less choices of mobile web browsers.159 The reasoning behind this 
is that devices running on Android without Play Store pre-installed are unattractive for the 
consumers. And in case MNOs or device manufacturers wanted to keep their devices attractive 
for its user base, they needed to pre-install Play Store, which meant that Google Search app and 
Google Chrome browser had to be pre-installed as well. The effect of pre-installation is even 
more concerning in the light of the fact that it is not possible to uninstall Google Chrome or 
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Google Search app on GMS devices.160 Therefore, consumer choice has been negatively 
affected by this conduct of Google, because it “deprived consumers of the prerogative to choose 
and was thus contrary to the ideal of ‘competition on the merits‘.”161 In short, optimal consumer 
choice could not been established on the market, because of the exclusionary anticompetitive 
conduct.  
Secondly, the above-mentioned payments, which manufacturers and MNOs received in 
case of exclusive pre-installation of Google Search on Android devices constituted, are, 
according to the Commission, exclusivity payments. These payments significantly restricted 
chances of other general search services being pre-installed on devices included in the portfolio. 
As a result, competitors were not able to gain enough traffic, data and revenue as Google 
Search. All of these factors are crucial for an incentive to innovate to arise. Moreover, this 
conduct, which effectively excluded other general search services from being pre-installed, 
provided Google with an advantage which allowed Google not to feel the pressure of innovation 
inflicted on it by its competitors. Therefore, yet again, exclusionary conduct replaced 
innovation, which inevitably harmed the consumer. 
Additionally, these payments “prevented the launch of Google Android devices pre-
installed with general search services other than Google Search”162, which influenced the 
choices that were present for the consumers to choose from on the market – whether quality-
wise or “just” in the number of choices. Therefore, the optimal consumer choice could not be 
established by the market. 
As already mentioned above, Android is an open-source operating system, which allows 
anyone to download and modify its code to create Android forks. This feature provides a great 
innovative potential, however, Google decided to eliminate it. With the help of AFA, Google 
effectively destroyed this innovative potential which the nature of open-source format provides. 
Indeed, Google argued that this conduct was crucial in order to prevent “fragmentation” of 
Android and that if it had not intervened, it could have resulted in technical difficulties and 
troubleshooting, which would ultimately damage the reputation of Android operating system. 
To counter this argument, the Commission stated that ”Google could have ensured that Android 
 
160 “Smart mobile devices which in addition to running on Google Android also pre-install the mandatory Google 
apps […] are referred to as ´GMS devices´”. See Case AT.40099, Google Android - Commission Decision 
C(2018) 4761, para. 131. 
 
161 SICILIANI, Paolo (2019). On the Law & Economic of the Android Case, Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice, Volume 10, Issue 10, page 641.  
 




devices using Google proprietary apps and services were compliant with Google's technical 
requirements, without preventing the emergence of Android forks.”163 
Therefore, yet again Google used exclusionary tactic to avoid competitive and 
innovative pressure, which could have arisen in case manufacturers were able to pre-install 
Google’s proprietary apps on forked Android devices.  Even in this case, the restriction imposed 
on competition by Google, leads to the detriment to the incentives to innovate, which is 
ultimately harmful to the consumers.  
Moreover, the Commission concluded, that “it was Google – and not users, app 
developers and the market – that effectively determined which operating systems could 
prosper.”164 Therefore, the lack of competition on the merits inevitably led to the inability of 
consumers to perform their own choice. The elimination of “credible competitive threat”165 in 
form of the devices which were functioning on “alternative” Android operating system left 
manufacturers as well as consumers without the possibility to reach optimal consumer choice.  
The acquisition of Android operating system in 2005 did not make it to the headlines 
back then, mostly because Android Inc., which developed Android, was merely a start-up 
company founded in 2003. Google acquired Android for only 50 million USD, which is a rather 
low amount, considering the fact that Google has since the acquisition earned over 31 billion 
USD in revenue and 22 billion USD in profit from Android operating system.166 Therefore, 
even though the acquired operating system is still on the market and has not been discontinued 
after the acquisition, the competition concerns were still valid. As mentioned above, in case 
dominant undertakings acquire new companies, competition concerns arise, even if the acquired 
service or product is still on the market and has not been discontinued. This is especially 
concerning in the markets which have high barriers to entry (which is definitely the case of 
Android app stores´ market) because new competitors are less likely to appear. 
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4.3.3. Problematic implementation of the remedy 
The Commission ordered Google to cease the anti-competitive conduct within 90 days 
after the decision. Vestager explained the application of the remedy in Android decision stating 
“decision stops Google from controlling which search and browser apps manufacturers can 
pre-install on Android devices, or which Android operating system they can adopt.”167 
Furthermore, Commissioner specified that “decision does not prevent Google from putting in 
place a reasonable, fair and objective system to ensure the correct functioning of Android 
devices using Google proprietary apps and services, without however affecting device 
manufacturers’ freedom to produce devices based on Android forks.”168 
However, this behavioural remedy has been implemented by Google in a similar “pay-
to-play” way as in Google Search decision. Google established an auction system for search 
engines which will appear as an option in front of the consumers on preference menu when 
setting up new Android device. Therefore, it came as no surprise that this solution has been 
criticized not only by Google´s competitors, but also by commentators, who claim that 
behavioural remedies are not enough, because the competition on the merits is not restored and 
instead structural remedies should be taken. 
Due to the unsatisfaction regarding Google’s compliance with the remedy and constant 
pressure of the Commission, on 17 June 2021 Google posted an announcement claiming that it 
will no longer be necessary for search engines to pay in order to appear in its choice box.169 
Instead, search engines can submit their application to appear on the choice screen which will 
consist of 12 randomly displayed search engines. Therefore, it seems like a welcomed change 
will happen on 1 September 2021 when this adjustment should be implemented. Perhaps the 
Commission’s approach will soon yield the desired results and consumer choice and 
innovations will thrive in this sphere again.  
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4.3.4. Conclusion  
Argumentation of the Commission as well as argumentation of Google were taken into 
the consideration when analysing Google Android decision. It has been established that Google, 
through a variety of anti-competitive conduct, restricted consumer choice and stifled incentives 
to innovate of its competitors. The Commission had to take an interventionist approach in order 
to amend the competition on the merits in the market for Android app stores and the national 
markets for general search services, although it does not appear like it has been successful in 
restoring competition on the merits, due to the yet again curious implementation of the remedy 
by Google. However, it seems like since September 2021 Google will adjust its implementation 
and innovations and consumer choice will thrive in this sphere again. 
Therefore, it has been demonstrated, that when there is a dominant undertaking on the 
market and it partakes in anti-competitive (exclusionary) conduct in the newly acquired market 
which has high barriers to entry, consumer choice will suffer as well as the innovative incentives 
of the rivals. To sum up, it seems as when these conditions are present competition authorities 
must be cautious.  
Google has appealed this decision as well, asking for its annulment. The hearing has yet to 
take place, however its pleas in law and main arguments are public already since 9 October 
2018. In its application, Google argues even the basis of the decision – the fact that Android is 
dominant or even the fact that Google Play is dominant. 170 However, the plea which I think 
will be one of the most interesting to see analysed is that “the preinstallation conditions are 
objectively justified because they enable Google to provide the Android platform for free”171, 
as this plea aims at the fact, that if manufacturers had to pay Google to obtain Android platform, 
the ones who would end up paying in the end would be the consumers and thus consumer harm 
would be inevitable. 
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5. Third case study - Google AdSense172 
5.1. Factual background  
As already mentioned in the chapters above, Google’s business model is relying 
predominantly on the revenue from online advertising. This notion is also demonstrated by the 
fact, that only in 2020 alone, Google’s advertising revenue was 146.92 billion dollars out of 
181.69 billion US dollars revenue overall.173 This should come as no surprise, because Google 
has been dominant in the market of online advertising intermediation since at least 2006 until 
2016.174 
Many websites allow consumers to search through their content through a search button. 
The result to a consumer’s search query appears alongside advertisements. Using its tool called 
“AdSense for Search”, Google is offering advertisements to the owners of websites 
(publishers), where these ads will eventually be published. Therefore, Google poses as “an 
advertising broker, between advertisers and website owners”.175 In short, the Commission 
recognizes Google’s AdSense as “online search advertising intermediation platform”.176  
Throughout the years, Google entered into multiple agreements regarding intermediation of 
advertisement with large publishers (website owners). Since 2003 Google included in these 
agreements a clause - “Exclusivity clause”177- which stipulated exclusivity of Google as an 
online search advertisement provider, worded as “publishers were prohibited from placing any 
search adverts from competitors on their search results pages”.178 
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Nevertheless, since 2009, these provisions on exclusivity were slowly replaced in some of 
the agreements with “Premium Placement”179 and “Minimum Google Ads Clause”180 clauses. 
In essence, this change meant that Google’s competitors could now place their ads on web 
owners’ webpages, however, Google’s adverts still had to be placed at the most visible, most 
attractive and most attention-grabbing place. Moreover, publishers had to publish certain 
(minimal) number of ads. 
Since March 2009, these agreements between Google and web owners additionally 
stipulated that in case web owners wanted to change the placement of adverts of competitors of 
Google, they were obligated to get a written consent from Google, which would allow them to 
change the position of the ads. 
All these above-mentioned strategies pre-empted Google’s competitors from competing on 
the merits, because at first, Google completely excluded its competitors, and after that Google 
reserved all the most attractive advertisement placements with the highest amount of “clicks” 
to itself. The result of this conduct was that Google generated the highest revenue and 
discouraged other online advertisement intermediators from competing with Google. Indeed, 
Google also created great network effects. 
On 20 March 2019 the Commission found Google has abused its dominant position on the 
market of online search advertising intermediation by involving the anti-competitive clauses in 
its agreements with third-party websites, which cemented Google’s dominant position in online 
search advertisement brokerage. Thus, this anti-competitive conduct, in words of Ms. Vestager 
“denied consumer choice, innovative products and fair prices”.181 
5.2. Summary of the decision 
The Commission has found that since 2006 until 2016 Google abused its dominant position 
in the market for online search advertising intermediation by breaching the competition rules 
in three different instances, amounting to one “single and continuous infringement”.182 In all of 
these instances Google stipulated contractual obligations for website owners (publishers). First 
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obligation was „to source all or most of their search advertising (the “search ads”) 
requirements from Google“183, second obligation was to provide Google´s ads with the most 
attractive placement and third obligation forced publishers to receive approval from Google in 
case of the change of placement of competitors´ search ads.  
5.3. Analysis 
5.3.1. The abusive conduct 
Google is an entire digital ecosystem, which offers multitude of various services, products 
and platforms which are interconnected. One of these platforms which Google offers since 2003 
is Google AdSense - a platform which “delivers Google ads on the websites of publishers”184.  
In the contracts concluded between Google and publishers of search ads since 2006, one of the 
provisions, titled as Exclusivity clause185 prohibited publishers from “implementing”186 or 
“providing access”187 to “any services which are the same as or substantially similar to any of 
the services being supplied by Google“.188 Therefore, Exclusivity clause prevented competitors 
from the access to the significant part of the market for intermediation of online search ads in 
the EEA. This conduct was found to be abuse of dominant position of Google on the market 
for intermediation of online search ads within the EEA by the Commission.  
Since mid-2009 Google slowly began to replace its Exclusivity clause from some of its 
agreements with the Premium placement clause and Minimum Google Ads Clause. Therefore, 
instead of total exclusivity reserved for ads provided by Google, publishers gained two new 
obligations. Firstly, they could not place competitors´ ads higher than those of Google or even 
too close to them. The purpose of this obligation was to ensure that Google´s ads had the most 
prominent display and therefore were noticed first by the consumers. Secondly, publishers had 
to request a certain number of ads for one search query. Both of these new obligations deterred 
website owners from sourcing search ads from other providers, because it was more convenient 
to source ads just from one provider – Google. 
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Moreover, since 2009, agreements between website owners and Google contained 
Authorising Equivalent Ads Clause which forced publishers to obtain written approval from 
Google, prior to any changes in the positioning of its competitors´ ads and overall display. The 
agreement between Google and publishers contained pre-approved screenshots, which were 
negotiated beforehand and contained exact position and overall display of Google´s search ads. 
Therefore, according to the Commission, Google´s anticompetitive conduct consisted of 
“three separate infringements of Article 102”189, overall amounting to one single and 
continuous infringement.  
5.3.2.  Consumer harm 
In my final analysis of this thesis, again, I will focus on the notion of consumer harm, in the 
light of qualitative criteria - consumer choice and innovation, when analysing Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct established in Google AdSense decision.190 As described in the 
paragraphs above, the anti-competitive conduct of Google presented in this decision consisted 
of three infringements, all of contractual nature, which amounted to one single infringement.  
The first infringement of competition law in this case was the implementation of Exclusivity 
clause into the contracts concluded between Google and third-party websites (publishers). 
According to the Commission, this clause “may have deterred innovation”191, because it was 
forbidden for the publishers to get search ads from Google´s competitors in the online 
advertisement intermediation market, which further deterred innovative incentives of these 
competitors. Moreover, not only were the competitors due to Google’s conduct unable to access 
large portions of the market of online ad intermediation services, but they were also unable to 
gain revenue which could have been later invested in the innovation of their services. This 
essentially exclusionary conduct inevitably harmed consumers, which were further deprived of 
innovations. 
Regarding the consumer choice, the Commission found that Exclusivity clause restricted 
the choice of search ads present in the market for the consumers, “as competing providers of 
online search advertising intermediation could have served or developed different search 
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ads“192 if they were able to access the market and compete on the merits. This has been opposed 
by Google, which argued, that consumer choice has not been restricted by Exclusivity clause, 
because „a number of ad formats competed for advertising space on the websites“193 of 
publishers, and even if the contracts with publishers did not include Exclusivity clause, 
competitors could not provide greater choice of search ads, because they “were likely to have 
access to the same portfolio of search ads as Google.“194  The Commission´s counterargument 
to this objection of Google is quite logical – it states that even if consumers already had a wide 
choice of search ads and the competitors of Google in the market of intermediation of online 
search advertisement had access to the same portfolio of search ads, this does not negate the 
fact that, absent the Google´s anti-competitive conduct, ad intermediators may have provided 
even wider choice of these search ads and thus consumers may have had even wider choice of 
search ads. Therefore, Google yet again used exclusionary conduct to avoid innovative 
pressure.  
The second infringement of competition law in this case, was the incorporation of Premium 
Placement and Minimum Google Ads Clause into the agreements concluded between Google 
and publishers, as these clauses were “capable of restricting competition.“195 Moreover, the 
Commission held that both of these provisions “may have deterred innovation”196, because 
publishers were discouraged to conclude parallel contracts with other online search ad brokers. 
In turn, these brokers, if there was a demand, could have provided various different search ads. 
Additionally, this conduct discouraged Google’s competitors in online search intermediation 
market from “investing in the development of innovative services, the improvement of the 
relevance of their existing services and the creation of new types of services.“197 This, yet again, 
ultimately may have harmed consumers, because if the Premium Placement and Minimum 
Google Ads Clause were not present in the contracts with the publishers, consumers could have 
enjoyed wider range of choice of search ads, as other intermediators of online search ads could 
have provided publishers with different, innovative search ads.  
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Lastly, in the contracts concluded with the publishers, Google began to include Authorising 
Equivalent Ads Clause. Just like in case of the other above-mentioned provisions, even in case 
of this clause, the Commission concluded that it constituted an abuse of dominant position of 
Google on the market for online search advertising intermediation within EEA. The 
Commission went on to establish that this restriction of competition also “may have deterred 
innovation”198 The reasoning behind this conclusion is similar to the reasoning above, as the 
Commission held that due to the anticompetitive conduct of Google publishers lost incentive to 
get search ads from multiple providers at the same time.  Therefore, as there has not been 
demand from (mainly big) publishers, brokers of search ads have been deterred from investing 
into innovation. Finally, this conduct further contributed to the consumer harm, more precisely 
to the negative influence of consumer choice. Commission found that absent the anti-
competitive clause, “users may have had a wider choice of search ads“.  
Google acquired Applied Semantics, which was a start-up company that helped Google to 
develop AdSense, already in 2003 for 102 million USD.199 This acquisition is often referred to 
as one of the most important acquisitions for Google, because it enabled Google to greatly 
upgrade its advertising, similarly to the acquisition of DoubleClick. It is estimated that AdSense 
nowadays generates over 15 billion USD, which constitutes approximately 23% of the overall 
revenue.200 And even though this could have been seen as a harmless talent acquisition, in the 
overall context of Google being able to use its dominant position in search engine market201 
and use the necessary data202 and network effects created by its Google Search platform203, it 
definitely raised competition concerns. These concerns were later justified by the 
Commission’s findings of Google abusing its dominant position in online search advertising 
within EEA.  
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5.3.3. Implementation of the remedy 
Google has removed all the above-mentioned problematic contractual obligations from its 
contracts with publishers. Therefore, only time will show whether this step will suffice for the 
competition to be restored on the merits.  
5.4. Conclusion 
As presented in the paragraphs above, absent Google’s anti-competitive conduct, which was 
based on the series of anti-competitive contractual obligations, optimal consumer choice and 
innovative search ads may have been present in the market. The Commission had to intervene 
and remedy Google’s behaviour, because it was Google’s conduct which disabled competition 
on the merits in the market for online search advertisement intermediation and ultimately 
harmed consumers. 
Therefore, as can be deducted from the analysis above, when there is a market with high 
barriers to entry (such as search advertisement market), which has been entered by an entrant 
which has a dominant position in the adjacent market and exclusionary conduct and other forms 
of anti-competitive conduct take place on this newly acquired market, it inevitably causes harm 
to the consumers.  
In June 2019 Google has appealed this decision as well, the hearing in this case is yet to 
take place. Google has not yet publicly commented on the content of its appeal any further and 
the Commission simply stated that it will defend its decision in Court.204 
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6. Future development in the digital sector 
6.1. Regulation 2019/1150205 
The European Union Platform to Business Regulation 2019/1150 or so called “P2B 
Regulation” applies since 12 July 2020 and governs online platforms such as online 
intermediation services and online search engines in quite a complex manner. While it mostly 
focuses its provisions on business users, some of the provisions are put in place with respect to 
the consumers as well. The main objective of P2B Regulation is that it provides “fair and 
transparent treatment of business users by online platforms”.206 This regulation includes 
stipulations on how terms and conditions of online intermediation services and online search 
engines should be drafted and what they should include. Furthermore, it provides rules for 
restriction, suspension and termination of these platforms, as well as the necessity of clear and 
accessible rules, for the ranking systems of business users, in place. Majority of these rules exist 
in order to improve the bargaining position of business entities, which depend on large 
platforms if they their business to prosper and be successful.  
 With regard to the online search engines, such as Google, the relevant obligations stipulated 
in this regulation are the ones concerning ranking and differentiated treatment. It is already 
deductible from Google Shopping case207 which has been analysed in the paragraphs above, 
that ranking “has an important impact on consumer choice and the commercial success of 
corporate website users.“208 Therefore, in connection to the issue of ranking, P2B Regulation  
establishes, that search engine platforms should “provide a description of the main parameters 
determining the ranking of all indexed websites.“209 This obligation should help business 
entities, which are being ranked, with an understanding how the ranking works and perhaps 
even adjust their websites in order to be ranked higher. The regulation also ensures that the 
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secrets of algorithms are kept safe by a provision which states that “online search engines 
should not be required to disclose the detailed functioning of their ranking mechanisms, 
including algorithms.“210 
Another obligation, which, if it would have existed before Google Shopping case211, would 
almost certainly affect the case, is the obligation of differentiated treatment in case of online 
search engines. This obligation ensures that when “online search engine itself offers certain 
goods or services to consumers through its own online search engine”212 it “acts in a 
transparent manner and provides a description of any differentiated treatment, whether 
through legal, commercial or technical means, that it might give in respect of goods or services 
it offers itself.”213 Therefore, there is a visible difference in the approach, because while in 
Google Shopping case Google was ordered to treat other comparison-shopping services 
equally, Article 7 of P2B Regulation allows providers of search engines to treat their own 
product differently, however, their terms and conditions have to contain a description of such 
treatment.  
Therefore, it is possible that P2B Regulation will increase innovation and consumer choice 
to a certain extent, however, this consequence will presumably emerge only as a “by-product”, 
as the objective of this regulation is about establishing fair and transparent market of online 
platforms without specific focus on consumer harm in terms of innovation or consumer choice. 
6.2. Digital Markets Act214 
As already explained in Chapter 1.1, network effects are inherent characteristic features of 
multi-sided platforms. Although the digital sector creates space for multitude of opportunities 
and has great innovative potential, due to the immense network effects which several largest 
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multi-sided platforms possess, it also gives rise to so-called “gatekeepers”215 or “gateways”. 
These gatekeepers are large platforms, which are often a part of an entire digital ecosystem, 
which in the end creates even higher barriers to entry. The impact of gatekeepers on the digital 
market is of great importance, because they often regulate or control the access to the market, 
which inevitably affects the contestability of the particular market and overall fairness towards 
the business users, who depend on these platforms to stay relevant. Ultimately, this ability to 
gatekeep the market, hurts the final consumers as well. At this moment, there is no EU 
legislation which would address issues which arise specifically in connection to these 
gatekeepers. However, “the new proposal for regulation on contestable and fair markets in the 
digital sector”216 referred to as Digital Markets Act (DMA) focuses exactly on these issues. 
Although it is a completely new regulation, it does not change current competition rules, only 
adds new tools to them. These new tools are necessary, in order to address the unfair practices 
and contestability issues, which “lead to inefficient outcomes in the digital sector in terms of 
higher prices, lower quality, as well as less choice and innovation to the detriment of European 
consumers”. 217 Therefore, the objectives of this proposed regulation are different yet 
complimentary to the objectives of competition law regulation in Articles 101 or 102 TFEU. In 
the spirit of ex ante regulation, DMA stipulates obligations for gatekeepers which they need to 
adhere to, in order to avoid penalties. 
One of the main reasons why gatekeepers retain their position as core platforms is primarily 
due to the “access to vast amounts of data that they collect while providing the core platform 
services as well as other digital services”. Thus, one of the important obligations stipulated in 
DMA is that gatekeepers shall “provide effective portability of data generated through the 
activity of a business user or end user”.218 In connection to the business users, this obligation 
is intended to aid with the disproportionality of amount of data, which each platform gains when 
their service is used. On the other hand, in connection to the final consumer, the above-
 
215 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in 
digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, page 34. 
 
216 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in 
digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, page 34. 
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mentioned obligation allows for much easier multi-homing, thus providing consumers with 
more choices and creating innovative pressure.  
Other important obligations, which would have affected for instance Google Android 
decision, are that the gatekeepers shall enable end-users to uninstall any preinstalled 
applications219 and they also shall “allow the installation and effective use of third-party 
software applications or software application stores”. There are even obligations, which would 
have affected Google Search case, such as obliging gatekeepers to “refrain from treating more 
favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third 
party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third 
party”220 – moreover, DMA stipulates that this ranking has to be fair and non-discriminatory221.  
Understandably, these are not the only obligations present in DMA, there are many more, 
focusing on the issues of interoperability, multi-homing and other, which enhance this already 
strong position and barriers to entry, which these gatekeepers providing core services created.  
However, although one of the main goals of DMA is “addressing market failures to ensure 
contestable and competitive digital markets for increased innovation and consumer choice“222, 
it is currently being criticized for not actually focusing on the consumers (end users), but rather 
on the business users as “end users are named as beneficiaries of the gatekeeper obligations in 
only 7 of the 18 obligations/prohibitions.”223 The European Consumer Organisation has even 
submitted its position on DMA, asking for changes to be made to it, so it can “fulfil its objectives 
for consumers”.224 It is also being argued that, in its current wording, DMA will have exactly 
the opposite effect to what its objectives are, and it will “undermine consumer choice and user 
protections (including security and privacy), and reduce incentives to innovate”.225 Therefore, 
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only future development of its final wording will show whether DMA actually will fulfil its 
potential to increase innovation and consumer choice.  
6.3. Conclusion 
Although the market of online platforms has been highly unregulated for years, with the use 
of the knowledge stemming from its experience in the field, the Commission was finally able 
to ascertain what are some of the main competition concerns regarding the large online 
platforms and how to enforce obligations which would focus on these concerns. With new 
regulations in place, competition law is trying to create a framework which provides 
gatekeepers and online platforms in general, with a set of rules which need to be followed. 
Indeed, these rules do not precede competition law principles and rules set-out in treaties, they 
merely complement them.226  
In general, I think it will be an exciting new chapter for the Commission with regard to the 
enforcement of competition rules, in the light of new regulations which give online platforms a 
chance to adjust their business model and the way it is functioning ex ante. The Commission 
even metaphorically describes the purpose of these new regulations as a “filter which removes 
some of that debris”227 before it gets to the Commission itself. Nevertheless, the obligations 
which have been drafted and implemented on the EU level do not yet seem to suffice with 
regard to the prevention of consumer harm in terms of stifling innovation and hampering of 
consumer choice.   
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Based on the above presented analyses of the decisions on Google´s abuse of dominant 
position within the EEA, the following conclusions can be formulated with regard to the 
research question, which undertakes to determine whether it was the conduct of Google itself 
that reduced, firstly, consumer choice and secondly, innovation or whether it was the allegedly 
interventionist approach of the Commission, demonstrated through its remedies stipulated in 
the decisions, which caused it.  
It can be concluded, that there appears to be an underlying pattern in all of the instances of 
abuse of dominant position by Google which were analysed. In all of the analysed cases Google 
used its dominant position in general search engine market as a tool to create an advantage for 
itself in the adjacent markets, which had high barriers to entry. In return, this newly acquired 
position on these newly entered markets again strengthened Google’s already strong (dominant) 
position in the general search engine market. This, although concerning from the competition 
law perspective, would perhaps still be feasible, if Google did not decide to use anti-competitive 
conduct (mainly exclusionary conduct) in order to eliminate its competitors on these newly 
acquired markets, instead of competing on the merits with them. This anti-competitive conduct 
then further disabled competition on the merits almost entirely and ultimately harmed 
consumers, as innovative incentives have been stifled and consumer choice has been reduced. 
Therefore, it can be deducted that it was the conduct of Google which hampered consumer 
choice and stifled innovations in the analysed decisions. Thus, it has been demonstrated through 
my analyses, that when there is a dominant undertaking present on the market and it partakes 
in the anti-competitive (exclusionary) conduct in newly (entered) acquired market, which has 
high barriers to entry, consumer choice as well as the innovative incentives of the rivals must 
suffer. 
As a reaction to the findings of Google’s abuse of dominance in all the analysed cases, the 
Commission fined Google and imposed behavioural remedies upon it, in order to reinstate 
competition on the merits on the respective markets. Google has been ordered to cease the anti-
competitive conduct and even given a list of unwanted behaviour, and it was left to create a 
final implementation of the criteria that were set by the Commission, as the remedy. However, 
so far, (perhaps except for Google AdSense decision) there is a general unsatisfaction with these 
remedies, because their objective (reinstating competition on the merits) has not been met in 
the majority of cases. Nevertheless, I do not think this dissatisfactory outcome is the issue of 
the remedies themselves, I would argue their wording and objectives are formulated clearly and 
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precisely enough to reach the restoration of the competition on the merits and therefore prevent 
consumer harm in terms of stifling innovation and reducing consumer choice. Rather, I think it 
is the manner of implementation of the remedies by Google, which, in my opinion, ignores the 
objectives stipulated by the remedies and essentially sabotages the purpose of them. As 
Google´s poor implementation fails to reach these objectives, consumer harm in terms of 
stifling innovation and limiting consumer choice is inevitably present. Therefore, it is not the 
remedies established by the Commission (and thus its approach) which further stifled 
innovation and reduced consumer choice, it is their implementation (or lack of) performed by 
Google itself.  
Finally, only upcoming years will show whether the Commission will impose further fines 
on Google, due to its failure to implement its behavioural remedies, or whether it will eventually 
take more controversial steps – such as structural remedies – in order to reinstate competition 
on the merits of the targeted markets. Nevertheless, nowadays, the Commission focuses mainly 
on ex ante regulation of online platforms in general, using tools like P2B Regulation and DMA, 
which should provide a basic framework for online platforms and help them ascertain what 
conduct can be problematic from the competition law perspective. Moreover, these regulations 
stipulate obligations for online platforms, focusing primarily on the concerns which large online 
platforms raise. However, it seems there is currently no regulation of (large) online platforms 
in place on the EU level, which would suffice at preventing consumer harm in terms of stifling 
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Informační technologie jako výzva pro soutěžní právo EU 
Google – zneužití dominantního postavení v EU 
Abstrakt 
 Google je primárně platformový ekosystém zaměřený na reklamu, jehož služby jsou 
denně využívané miliony uživateli, mnohé bez peněžité kompenzace. I přes tento nesporný 
benefit, musela Evropská Komise do podnikání společnosti Google zasáhnout kvůli jejímu 
protisoutěžnímu jednání (zneužití dominantního postavení) v rámci EEA, uložením finančních 
sankcí a stanovením dalších nápravných opatření se záměrem obnovit hospodářskou soutěž na 
základě výkonnosti a zastavit tak další poškozování spotřebitelů.  
 Cílem této diplomové práce je stanovit, zda poškozování spotřebitelů v kvalitativním 
smyslu (prostřednictvím redukování výběru pro spotřebitele a potlačování inovací) bylo 
způsobeno jednáním společnosti Google na hospodářském trhu, nebo zda to způsobil údajný 
intervenční přístup Evropské Komise, která uložila vícero nápravných opatření v rozhodnutích 
vedených s touto společností, se záměrem obnovit hospodářskou soutěž.  K dosažení cíle této 
práce, jsou nejdříve v Kapitole 1 objasněné ekonomické reálie mnohostranných platform, 
následně, Kapitola 2 specifikuje institut poškození spotřebitele v rámci digitálního trhu ve 
spojení s faktory, které ovlivňují institut poškozování spotřebitele. Kapitoly 3 až 5 obsahují tři 
samostatné analýzy třech separátních rozhodnutí Evropské Komise stran zneužití dominantního 
postavení společností Google – jmenovitě – analýzu rozhodnutí ve věci Google Shopping 
v Kapitole 3, analýzu rozhodnutí ve věci Google Android v Kapitole 4 a analýzu rozhodnutí ve 
věci Google AdSense v Kapitole 5.  Všechny tyto analýzy se zabývají zaprvé skutečným 
jednáním společnosti Google a jeho důsledky a zadruhé hodnocením provedeným Evropskou 
Komisí a jeho dopadem, přičemž se v klíčových bodech pozornost soustředí na koncept výběru 
spotřebitele a inovací. Nakonec je v Kapitole 6 představen budoucí vývoj online platforem v 
digitálním sektoru s ohledem na jejich nedávno připravenou regulaci. Shrnutí poté rekapituluje 
všechny informace získané z analyzovaných rozhodnutí a utváří závěry z takto nabytých 
poznatků. 
 
Klíčová slova: Google, zneužití dominantního postavení, poškození spotřebitele, výběr 
spotřebitele, inovace  
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Information technology as a challenge for European law 
Google – abuse of dominant position within the EU 
Abstract 
Google is primarily an ad-centric platform-based ecosystem and its services are daily 
used by millions of consumers, many without any monetary compensation. However, despite 
this undeniable benefit, due to its anti-competitive conduct (abuse of its dominant position) 
within the EEA, the European Commission had to intervene and impose fines and remedies on 
Google in order to restore competition on the merits and cease further consumer harm. 
The objective of this thesis is to establish, whether it was the conduct of Google which 
caused consumer harm, in qualitative terms of diminishing consumer choice and stifling 
innovation, or whether it was the allegedly interventionist approach of the European 
Commission, established through the remedies stipulated in the analysed decisions, which 
caused it. To reach this objective, firstly, the economic realities of multisided platforms are 
explained in Chapter 1. Afterwards, in Chapter 2, the specification of consumer harm in the 
digital markets coupled with the factors which influence consumer harm are discussed. Then, 
in Chapters 3 to 5 three separate analyses of three separate decisions on Google´s abuse of 
dominant position are presented – namely – Google Shopping decision analysis in Chapter 3, 
Google Android decision analysis in Chapter 4 and finally Google AdSense decision analysis 
in Chapter 5. All these analyses address firstly, the actual conduct of Google and its 
consequences and secondly, the assessment done by the European Commission and its impact, 
while keeping in the spotlight the concept of consumer choice and innovation as the key 
principles. Finally, in Chapter 6 the future development in the digital sector with regard to the 
online platforms´ recently stipulated regulation is introduced. Summary then encapsulates all 
of the acquired findings from the analysed decisions and forms conclusions based on them.  
 
Key words: Google, abuse of dominant position, consumer harm, consumer choice, 
innovations 
